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Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Decisions
By W. KiP VISCUSI

AND JAMES

A large literature in economics and social
science focuses on how people reason about
risks. Reactionsof individualsto risk frequently
departfrom behaviorpredictedby full information variants of expected utility theory. Risk
regulatorsarehumanand are subjectto political
pressuresthatarereflective of people's attitudes
towardrisk. As a result, the public policies they
espouse may reflect errors in judgment about
risk.
Many biases stem from misperceptions of
risk. Individuals overestimate small probabilities, overestimate the risks associated with
highly publicizeddangers,andhave preferences
over the manner (not just the magnitude) in
which risks arise. Environmentalrisks associated with hazardouswaste sites may be particularly prone to such errors since they involve
small risks that are highly publicized. Indeed,
the general public ranks hazardouswaste sites
as the leading environmentalrisk.'
A growing literaturealso analyzes how the
decisions of risk regulatorsdepartfrom choices
predictedin a standardbenefit-costframework.
As Roger G. Noll and James E. Krier (1990)
point out, since regulatorsare both human and
political their decisions may reflect risk
"biases."Regulatorsmay exhibit these biases as
individuals and because their constituentswill
express regulatorydemands based on risk per-

* Viscusi: Harvard Law School, Harvard University,
Cambridge,MA 02138; Hamilton:SanfordInstituteof Public Policy, Duke University, Durham,NC 27708. We have
benefited from the comments from two referees and the
excellent research assistance of Jason Bell, Kristen Blann,
Jahn Hakes, and Robert Malme. Research support was
providedunderCooperativeAgreementNo. CR-823604-01
from the U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Office of
Policy, Planning, and Evaluation.Dr. Alan Carlin and Dr.
Suzanne Giannini-Spohn served as contract officers. All
views (and errors)expressed are our own.
l See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(1987) for a reporton this survey evidence.
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ceptions. Risk regulatorsmay take into account
the identity of the parties exposed to risk, the
level of scrutiny by interest groups, the nature
of congressionalrepresentationof affected constituents,and the degree of political activity by
potentially exposed individuals.3Errorsin risk
perceptionsand risk decisions cause individuals
to diverge from expected utility maximization.
Similar errors by policy makers and the influence of risk politics cause regulatorsto diverge
from social welfare maximization.
This paper examines decisions made by federal and stateregulatorsat hazardouswaste sites
addressedby the Superfundprogramto determine how their decisions diverge from those
predictedby expected utility theory and benefitcost analysis. We analyze whetherrisk perceptions and politics influence two decisions
central to the "how clean is clean" debate at
Superfund sites-the selection of chemical
cleanuptargetsand the expenditureof remediation funds at these contaminatedsites. We also
explore the interactiveinfluence of risk-perception factors and political demands.
Previous researchon the regulationof chemical risks in standard setting indicates that
decisions reflect evidence of risk biases and
responsiveness to political factors. In assessing
the determinantsof the EPA's decision to cancel pesticide registration,Maureen L. Cropper
et al. (1992) found thatthe EPA was more likely
to cancel a pesticide in instances featuring
higher risks to the maximally exposed individual user, lower benefits associated with continued use of the pesticide, higher values of
intervention by environmental groups (mea2 This theme is also articulatedin RichardJ. Zeckhauser
and Viscusi (1990). Noll (1989) provides a more general
assessmentof the interactionbetween political concernsand
regulatorypolicy, which is a central theme of this paper.
3Political factors have long played a prominentrole in
local hazardouswaste policies. See, among others, Linda
Cohen (1981), HowardKunreutherand Douglas Easterling
(1990, 1992), and Kunreutherand Rajeev Gowda (1990).
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sured by regulatorycomments), and lower values of interventionsby business groups. In the
decision of which chemicals to regulate across
differentagencies, Viscusi (1995) found thatthe
federalgovernmentwas much more likely, for a
given level of risk, to regulaterisks arisingfrom
syntheticchemicals thanthose arisingfrom naturally occurring sources. This result is consistent with the "referencerisk effect' (Viscusi et
al., 1987) and the "statusquo" bias established
by William Samuelson and Zeckhauser(1988).
In a review of 132 regulatorydecisions involving cancer risks, Curtis C. Travis et al. (1987)
found that in choosing which chemical risks to
regulate, federal agencies were strongly influenced by the levels of maximum individual
cancer risks [e.g., every risk above 4 X 10-3
was regulatedandno actionwas taken(with one
exception) on risks below 1 X 10-6]. Therewas
not a "strongcorrelationbetween the size of the
populationexposed and the likelihood of regulation,"but there was an influence of total population risks (e.g., expected annual cancer
deaths) on the likelihood of regulation.George
Van Houtven and Maureen L. Cropper(1996)
stress the importance of examining regulator
decisions aboutrisk ratherthan simply focusing
on statutoryguidelines, for they find that the
EPA consideredboth costs and risks in issuing
standardseven in programs where legislation
indicatedcosts were not to be considered.
There is mixed evidence on how Superfund
regulatorsrespondto the natureof risks and the
nature of the community bearing these risks.
Shreekant Gupta et al. (1995) found that in
setting cleanup targets at Superfund sites the
agency did not appearto take cleanupcosts into
account (consistent with the congressional admonitionto protecthealthwithoutconsideration
of costs), did set more protective standardsin
minority areas, and left higher risks in places
with higherbaseline risks (interpretedas resulting from a diminishing marginal utility from
cancer cases averted). John A. Hird (1993,
1994) found that once sites were in the EPA's
pipeline for remediation,the progressof the site
throughthe phases of site investigation,record
of decision (i.e., cleanup decision), and remediation did not depend on the socioeconomic
characteristicsof the counties containing the
sites. He also found that the relevant congressional Superfundoversight committees had lit-
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tle or no impact on the extent or pace of
cleanups of sites in the districts/statesof committee members.Rae Zimmerman(1993) found
that communities with higher percentages of
minorities were less likely to have cleanup decisions in place than other communities, while
communities with sites that generated more
controversy(as measuredby news media coverage and a survey of EPA site managers)were
more likely to have cleanup plans established.
Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle (1992)
found that progress towardcleanup was slower
in minoritycommunities,which were also more
likely to have less permanentremedies selected.
In a larger study controlling for many factors,
Gupta et al. (1996) found that in selecting the
permanence of a site remediation, the agency
was not significantly influencedby the median
household income or racial composition of the
surroundingpopulation.
This articlemakes four distinct contributions
to the growing literatureon agency decisions
about risk. First, we base our analysis on a
detailed assessment of the costs and benefits of
hazardouswaste cleanups.Using geographicinformationsystems (GIS) technology and block
group-level Census data, we develop estimates
of the expected numberof cancercases avoided
on a site-level basis. The risk data used in these
calculations are the most comprehensivein the
literatureand are calculatedon a consistent basis across sites. The estimated cost per cancer
case avoided serves as a direct efficiency
measure.
Second, we analyze how cleanup decisions
and the efficiency of cleanup decisions are affected by a variety of risk variables. These
measures capturethe influence of potential biases in the responseto risk thathave been found
in various survey and laboratorysettings. Thus,
we examine whether identifiedpatternsof irrationality in individual decision-making influence the agency's hazardous waste cleanup
decisions.
Third, we also explore the role of political
factors in influencing cleanup decisions using
measures of voter turnout and congressional
voting records. While some previous studies
have investigated whether political factors influence EPA decisions, they have noted that
regulatorscould be concerned about the preferences of affected parties because of efficiency
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concerns. If one holds constant demographic
factors associated with willingness to pay to
avoid risks or preserve the environment,however, one would not expect the likelihood of
collective action by constituents to matter if
regulators were only concerned about
efficiency.
Fourth,we examine the role of political factors and risk measures and their interactiveeffect in influencing the efficiency of cleanup
decisions. Does the effect of political variables,
for example, enhancethe efficiency of cleanups
by making them more responsive to those exposed to risks, or are political factors most
powerful when the economic rationale for
cleanup is weakest? Ours is the first analysis to
distinguishthe differentialeffect of such influences based on the relative efficiency of the
cleanup decision.
Our findings indicate that most of the significant influences on Superfundsite decisions do
not follow the expected patternfor efficient risk
management.Policy makerssometimesrespond
to the expected costs of remediation and the
expected number of people exposed to cancer
risks in the desired economic direction. While
both of these factors would be consistent with a
standardbenefit-cost analysis, their consideration is inconsistent with the remediationpolicies enunciatedby the Congress (which directs
the EPA to make Superfunddecisions without
explicitly requiringit to examine costs) and the
agency (whose cleanup decisions are stated in
terms of individual risk reduction without regard to the populationsexposed to these levels
of risk). Cleanup target selection does reflect
biases from the individualrisk-perceptionliterature,such as the availabilityeffect (e.g., more
highly publicized chemicals that create high
risks receive more stringent targets) and the
anchoringphenomenon(e.g., regulatorstolerate
a highercleanuptargetrisk the greaterthe baseline risk). Politics also plays a role in remediation decisions, since communities with higher
voter turnoutsare more likely at times to have
lower final risks remainingat sites and to have
more spent to avert an expected case of cancer.
We find these political influences are most influentialfor the least cost-effective site cleanups
and the lowest site risks. Overall, we find that
Superfundexpendituresdo not fare well when
evaluatedin terms of cancer prevention.At the
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median site expenditurein our sample, the cost
per case of cancer preventedis in excess of $6
billion.
Section I describes the Superfunddecisionmakingprocess and the database we developed
to analyze these hypotheses. Section [Iprovides
estimates of the influences on the selection of
cleanup target risk level and the costs incurred
per case of cancer prevented, and Section III
explores determinantsof the distributionof the
costs per case of cancer averted. Section IV
summarizesconclusions about the role of perceptions and politics in the managementof environmentalrisks.
1. SuperfundDecision-making
A. Program Prescriptions
The Superfund program provides federal
money for the cleanup of contaminatedhazardous waste sites. Risks to human health at contaminatedsites can be dealt with in a numberof
ways, including institutionalcontrols that limit
access to a site, containmentof wastes or their
removal to repositories,or the treatmentof contaminatedgroundwaterand soils. In 1986 Congress revised the programand gave the agency
explicit directions on site remediations. The
EPA was to favor treatmentthat "permanently
and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity,
or mobility of hazardoussubstances"(42 U.S.C.
9621(b)(1)). The legislation also declared that
remedial actions at sites must meet federal environmentalstandardsconsidered to be "applicable or relevantand appropriate"requirements
(ARARs) and mandatedthat, with few exceptions, state ARARs had to be met at Superfund
sites if they were more stringent than federal
ones. In 1990 the EPA announced guidelines
indicatingthattwo criteria,overall protectionof
human health and the environmentand the attainment(or specific waiver) of federaland state
ARARs, would serve as the thresholdsthatmust
be met by every site remedy.After these thresholds were met, site managers could consider
factors such as permanenceof remedy, reduction of toxicity, cost-effectiveness, and state and
communityacceptanceof a remedy. In 1991 the
agency provided further guidance on cleanup
actions, which stated that "where the cumulative carcinogenicsite risk to an individualbased

VOL.89 NO. 4

VISCUSIAND HAMILTON:ARE RISKREGULATORSRATIONAL?

on reasonablemaximumexposure for both current and future land use is less than 10-4, and
the noncarcinogenichazardquotientis less than
one, action generally is not warrantedunless
there are adverse environmentalimpacts"(U.S.
EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 1991). The
directive stated that remedial actions at sites
with cancer risks between 10-4 and 10-6 were
up to the discretion of the site decision maker
and that once a remediationwas undertakenthe
cleanup goal should be in the 10-4 to 10-6
range. In practice, the cleanup goal is often
more stringent.
By 1992 there were reports of over 36,000
contaminated sites of potential concern to the
EPA. Using a ranking method called the Hazard Ranking System that combines information on contamination levels with potential
exposure to populations, the EPA has placed
nearly 1,400 sites on the National Priorities
List (NPL), which qualifies a site for the
expenditure of federal remediation funds. At
each site the EPA undertakesremedial investigation and feasibility studies, which include
an assessment of cancer and noncancer risks
and a discussion of the costs of remediation
options. Given the risk and cost information
generated at the site and the legislative and
regulatory framework enunciated, the regional EPA administratorofficially issues at
each site a Record of Decision (ROD) that
describes which remedy has been chosen and
what the target cleanup goals are, expressed
in terms of chemical concentration or risk
levels remaining after remediation. A remedial project manager supervises decisions at
each site. The "regulators" whose decisions
we are modeling here thus involve different
levels of EPA officials, some of whom will be
familiar with the minute details at sites and
others of whom focus on broader policy objectives.
EPA conductsthe risk assessmentsaccording
to a given set of guidelines, the 1989 U.S. EPA
Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund
(RAGS). EPA characterizesthe cancerand noncancer risk pathways at a site by the time scenario of exposure (e.g., does the pathway
involve current or future uses of the site?),
exposed populations(residents?workers?),exposed age-group (adult or child?), population
location (onsite? offsite?), medium location
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(onsite or offsite?), exposure medium (soil or
groundwater?),and exposureroute (dermal?ingestion?) (KatherineD. Walker et al., 1995).
Estimating these risks involves assumptions
about the durationof exposure, frequencywith
which an individualis exposed, ingestion rates
for water and soil, contaminantconcentration,
and chemical toxicity. The EPA's guidelines
encourageconservatismin the estimate of scenarios (e.g., future residentialland use is often
assumed even if the surroundingarea is industrial) and conservatism in parameterassumptions (e.g., upper-boundestimates are used for
exposure duration, and the 95-percent confidence limit on the estimateof the mean concentration of the chemical or the maximum
detected concentration is used, whichever is
lower, to representa chemical's concentration
at a site). These biases, in effect, institutionalize
ambiguityaversion biases.4
B. The SuperfundSample
and the EmpiricalModels
Our analysis of the response of regulatorsto
risks uses an original data base that we developed using the extensive risk and cost data
generatedby the Superfundpolicy decision process. For the set of 267 nonfederalsites where
cleanupdecisions were made in 1991-1992, we
collected cost information on these sites and
risk data on a subsampleof 150 sites (Hamilton
andViscusi, 1995). This yielded a humanhealth
risk databasewith informationon over 20,000
chemical-level risk pathways at the 150 sites,
which enabled us to develop estimates of the
numberof cancercases avertedby remediations
and the cost of cancer averted at these sites
(Hamiltonand Viscusi, 1998).5 For a subset of
the sample, the Records of Decision provided
detailed information on the risk levels and
chemical concentrationschosen as cleanup targets. We coupled this site-specific information

4This phenomenonis, for example, consistent with the
kind of irrationalityreflected in the well-known Ellsberg
Paradox.
5 A chemical-level risk pathway indicates the risk to a
particularpopulation arising from a given exposure media
arising from a specific chemical contaminantat a site, e.g.,
the risk to current on-site residents from consumption of
groundwatercontaminatedwith benzene.
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with a series of other variablesnot often available in the EPA analyses, such as population
density.
In this paper we focus on two decisions at
these sites: the cancer risks selected as cleanup
targets (e.g., the individuallifetime excess cancer risks that will remain after cleanup) and the
implied cost per cancercase avertedat each site.
The primaryunit of analysis in the target risk
study is the chemical pathway. For a given
chemical at a site where the baseline and target
concentrationof risk were providedin site documents, we analyze how the target risk chosen
(i.e., the risk from the chemical thatwill remain
aftersite cleanup)varies for the 2,888 pathways
at 86 sites where these targets were announced
in 1991-1992. At the broader site level, we
investigatehow expendituresper case of cancer
preventedvaried across 130 sites.
To establish an efficiency referencepoint for
the analysis, consider a regulatormaking a site
remediationdecision on the basis of a benefitcost analysis of the reduction in cancer risks
arising from contaminationat the site. The regulator will consider the reductionin individual
cancer risk, expressed as the baseline risk B
minus the targetrisk T. Note that B and T are
the actual cancer risks as calculated from risk
assessment methodology as specified by the
EPA. The numberof avertedcancer cases from
remediation is the change in individual risk
(B - 7) multiplied by the population E exposed to the baseline risk. The value to the
social welfare maximizing regulatorof this reduction in expected cancers is the number of
expected cancercases avertedmultipliedby the
value V per cancer case averted.The cost C of
the given remediationis a functionof initial site
contamination,the final targetrisk T chosen as
the cleanup target, and additionalchemical and
site characteristics
S which affect the remediation
costs, such as the treatmentof contaminatedsoil
or groundwater.The social welfare maximizing
regulatorwill thus choose T to maximize social
welfare, so thatmarginalbenefits lost from raising the targetrisk equal the marginalcost sav-

6

For simplicity we focus on the benefits of cancer reduction since most policy action triggersare tied to cancer
effects ratherthan other benefits from site remediation.
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ings from a less stringent target for the
optimally chosen policy.
There are severalreasons why the targetrisks
chosen by the EPA may diverge from those
predictedin the social welfare maximizing example. Regulatorsmay, of course, not be maximizing this efficiency measure but may have
other more narrowlydefined objectives such as
reducingrisk to a reasonablelevel. Even if the
objective is to generatepolicies thatproducethe
greatest gains in societal welfare, decisions
could be flawed in a numberof ways. Regulators might reason on the basis of perceivedrisks
because they are attemptingto representthe risk
perceptions of their constituents. Regulators
also might reasonon the basis of perceivedrisks
because they exhibit the risk-perceptionpatterns evident among individuals in their daily
risk choices.
Regulator decisions may also diverge from
those predictedby social welfare maximization
if regulators(or their constituents)value different populationsdifferently. A well-known bias
in contingent valuation studies known as the
scope effect is that individualestimates of willingness to pay for some environmentalamenity
may be invariantto the scope of the good being
purchased.For example, survey respondentsreport the same willingness to pay to save 2,000
migratorywaterfowl as for 200,000 migratory
waterfowl. The practical consequence of this
bias for hazardouswaste cleanup decisions is
thatthe valuationof the cleanupactionsmay not
be sufficientlysensitive to the numberof people
exposed. Indeed,the statedEPA risk-assessment
policies incorporatethis scope effect since the
agency expresses cleanup targets in terms of
reductionof individualrisk levels ratherthanan
analysis of reduction in expected cancer cases
overall. If some individuals are more highly
valued by regulators,perhapsbecause they are
more politically active and hence more likely to
scrutinize regulatoractions, then the nature of
who bears the risk may also affect site-level
Superfunddecisions.
The empiricalanalysishere will focus on two
measures of regulatorystringency-the natural
7 See William H. Desvousges et al. (1992), Peter A.
Diamond and JerryA. Hausman(1994), Michael W. Hanemann (1994), and Paul R. Portney(1994), who discuss such
influences.
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logarithmof the targetrisklevel T andthe natural
logarithmof the cost percase of cancerprevented.
The targetrisks are often very small (e.g., 1o-9)
but are not zero so thattakingthe logarithmof T
is feasible.We estimatetwo differentvariantsof a
targetrisk model using the 2,888 chemicalpathways as the unit of observation:
m

n

(1) ln Tij = a + E

PkXijk + E

k=1

YkZjk + E1ij,
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count the presence of correlated errors within
data clusters.8
The analysis of the log of the cost per case of
cancer Qj at site j has a similar specification
except that the unit of observationis at the site
level, leading to a sample of 130 sites. The
site-level fixed-effects term drops out, and the
variables depend only on the site j, not particular chemicals i. The resulting equation to be
estimated is

k=l
n

and

(3)

ln Qj = a3 +>

kZjk +E3j,
k=1

m

(2)

ln

T,1=

aD1 +

>

IkXijk + E2i,

k=1

where Tij is the risk target for chemical i at
site j, Xijk is a chemical pathway characteristic k for chemical i at site i, I8k is the
regression coefficient for characteristic k
among the set of variables in Xi;k' Zjk iS site
characteristic variable k that varies only by
site j not by chemical, Yk iS its coefficient, Dj
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of
1 for site j and 0 otherwise, and El ij andE2ij
are random error terms. The site attributesin
Z4k' such as the voting rate of the community,
are of independent interest so we first estimate equation 1 in which we include a vector
of site characteristic variables and a single
constant term a rather than the site-specific
constant terms. Inclusion of the site-specific
constant terms in equation 2 makes it possible
to analyze the influence of chemical characteristics controlling for all other fixed sitespecific influences.
Since EPA guidance directives (1991) treat
risks greater than or equal to 10-4 differently
(i.e., risks this high trigger site remediations),
we separate our analysis of standard setting
into two samples. We run specifications (1)
and (2) for high-risk pathways, defined as
those representing risks of 10-4 or greater,
and for low-risk pathways, those with risks
less than 10-4. Since a given pathway at a site
may contribute multiple observations to the
analysis, residuals may be correlated within a
pathway. We account for this by estimating
robust standard errors, which take into ac-

where Zjk is the value of variable k at site j,
tIk is its coefficient, andE3j
is a random error
term. We exclude some site characteristics
from the cost-per-cancer-case analysis because of the much smaller sample size at the
site level. For the cost per case of cancer
analysis, the chemical-specific variables in
Xijk drop out of the analysis because the cost
data are at the site level.9
Both T and Q are jointly determined by the
choice of the cleanup option and its associated cost and target risk level. These measures differ to some extent in that policy
decisions involve a choice among policy options and not just the level of stringency of a
particularpolicy option.10Thus, for example,
there could be several policy choices that
achieve the same target risk level with differing costs per case of cancer. Our analysis of
target risk levels and cost per case of cancer
can be viewed as a reduced-form analysis in
which we treat the target risk levels and cost
per cancer case as functions of exogenous
chemical and site characteristic measures.
8
See Peter J. Huber (1967) and William H. Rogers
(1993) for discussion of this procedure.Clusterswere based
upon unique pathways defined by site, exposure medium,
time frame, exposure location, and age of the potentially
exposed population.
9 Although the numberof variableswas great, multicollinearitywas not a majorproblemin the targetrisk analysis
with large sample size, and only minor amendmentswere
needed for the cost-per-cancer-caseanalysis.
'?Gupta et al. (1996) find that the agency's decision
about the permanenceof a site remediationis affected by
factors such as cleanup costs.
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II. Target Risk and Cost per Cancer Case

A. TargetRisk Equation Estimates

EPA officials who make the cleanup decisions at Superfund sites have a number of
stated criteria to guide them. If the overall
lifetime excess cancer risk to an individual
from site contamination is 10-4 or higher,
EPA guidelines suggest that the site should be
remediated so that the remaining risk is somewhere within the 10-4 and 10-6 interval or
below. If baseline risks are already within this
range, the site manager has discretion to remediate. If there exist state or federal standards from other environmentalprogramsthat
apply to a chemical (e.g., ARARs), then the
remediation should meet these standards.The
cleanup goals enunciated by site managers are
generally not expressed at the site level. Instead, they are target chemical concentrations
or chemical pathway risks that will remain
after the EPA's remediation has been carried
out. Our analysis thus focuses on the chemical
risk pathway as the unit of analysis. We focus
on cancer risks since there is not a good
standard metric that allows one to compare
noncancer risks (e.g., some chemicals give
rise to noncancer effects such as skin rashes,
while others generate liver damage).
Figure 1 indicates that if we treat the EPA
Superfund risk assessments at face value and
examine chemical pathway risks, these risk
levels are high compared to many other regulatory programs. For 480 of the 2,888 chemical pathways, the risk is at least 10-4. These
risks are high in part because of conservative
assumptions made about parametervalues in
the risk assessments (Viscusi et al., 1997).
The distribution of the remediation pathway
risks remaining at sites shifts downward after
remediation, as only 104 pathways pose a risk
of at least 10-4. As Figure 1 illustrates, there
is a corresponding increase in the number of
pathways posing a risk of 10-6 or less after
remediation.
The log of the chemical targetrisks (i.e., the
individuallifetime excess cancerrisk remaining
from a chemical pathway after site remediation
is completed)is the unit of analysisin our initial
examinationof reactionsto risk. The 86 sites in
the sample with both baseline and target risk
data averaged 34 chemical risk pathways with
associated baseline and targetrisks.

Table 1 reports the regression estimates of
equation (1) and the counterpartfixed-effects
estimates of equation (2) for both high- and
low-risk chemical pathwaysamples. We distinguish the high- and low-risk pathways because
of the differentpolicy criteriabased on pathway
risk levels. In each case, the naturallogarithmof
the targetrisk afterremediationis the dependent
variable. Higher (lower) values of the dependent variable reflect less (more) stringent
cleanup in terms of the level of risk that is
permittedto remain at the site. Standarderrors
reportedare robust to the possible presence of
correlated errors across chemicals within a
given pathway of a site.
Our results provide strong support for the
influence of risk perceptionsand politics on the
selection of remediation targets at Superfund
sites. Consider first the two principalmeasures
of the potency of the chemicals. In both the
overall and the fixed-effects estimates, more
toxic chemicals and chemicals associatedwith a
higher initial risk level have higher targetrisks
after remediation.Thus, there is less stringent
regulationin terms of the outcome of the more
potent chemicals. This result could reflect efficiency concerns, as there may be increased
costs for remediatingmore toxic chemicals as,
for example, these may take longer to remediate. There also may be increasedmarginalcosts
of cleanup. Other possibilities include regulators exhibiting diminishing marginalutility for
cancer cases averted or anchoring, so that the
initial level of risk influences perceptionsabout
what remainingrisks are safe. For example, if
regulators' notion of what is a "safe" level of
risk is anchored by the estimation from the
baseline risk assessments, they will select
higherremainingrisk targetsat sites with higher
initial levels of risk.
One risk measurethatis influentialin leading
to more stringentrisk targetsis not a measureof
chemicalpotency but ratherthe chemical's public notoriety.11 Controlling for various risk" The numberof times the chemical is mentionedin the
Lexis general news file from 1988-1992 as hazardousor
toxic and carcinogenicis the chemical media citations variable, which serves as a measure of availability bias. The
more frequent the mention of a given chemical in the
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level measures, the larger the number of
mentions of a chemical in the popularpress the
more stringentis the targetrisk selected in the
case of high-risk pathways. This result is consistent with the availabilityheuristic,since both
regulatorsandthose surroundingsites may view
particular carcinogens as more dangerous if
they have received more media coverage. The
higher perceived baseline risks for more publicized chemicals will cause the regulatorsto set
a lower targetrisk T. If a given T appearsmore
dangerous for more highly publicized chemicals, this will also promote the selection of a
more stringentcleanup level.
Perhaps the most surprisingchemical pathway variable in terms of its lack of statistical
significance is whether the time frame of the
pathwayis current.The interactionof this variable with whetherthe site is a residentialpath-

popularpress (e.g., coverage of PCBs), the more likely it is
that regulators or residents will perceive the chemical as
dangerouseven controllingfor the level of the risk and its
toxicity. More frequently cited chemicals consequently
should receive lower risk targets.We also include the number of times a site was mentioned in news coverage. Sites
with more coverage should have more prominencewith the
general public and may appearto be riskier, leading to a
lower level of T and a higher value of Q.

way (i.e., the currentresidentpathwayvariable)
is also not statisticallysignificant,except in the
high-risk fixed-effects equation. These results
suggest that the presence of current exposed
populations to health risks generally does not
enter EPA's decision with respect to the stringency of cleanup. By treatingexisting populations exposed to risk with the same weight as is
placed on hypothetical populations based on
changes in future land uses, EPA is failing to
adjustthe hypotheticalrisk scenariosfor the fact
that there is some probabilitythat there will not
be such future exposed populations.Moreover,
if they are exposed, the discounted benefits of
preventingtheir exposure will be less than will
arise fromprotectingcurrentpopulationsnow at
the site. The higher targetrisk level for residential pathways is also inconsistent with healthbased concerns. This may reflect a skepticism
on the part of policy makers, who may believe
that these residentialscenarios are less likely to
arise and consequently will have a lower expected value.12
The estimatesin Table 1 includerisk-perception

12
See Hamilton and Viscusi (1994) for documentation
of the dominance of hypothetical future on-site resident
scenarios in the EPA risk assessments.
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TABLE 1-REGRESSION
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ESTIMATES OF THE LN OF THE TARGET RISK LEVELa

(i) High risk

(ii) Low risk

(iii)b High risk

(iV)b Low risk

Chemicalpathway
Volatile organic compound
Inorganic compound (metals)
Log of the chemical toxicity (mg/kg-day)-'
Log of the initial chemical pathway risk
Chemical media citations (in thousands),
1988-1992
Soil pathway
Time frame of pathway is current
Residential pathway
Current resident pathway
Child pathway
Remediation target concentrations based on
state regulatory standards
Remediation target concentrations based on
stated human health risk

1.005
(0.656)
3.434***
(0.566)
0.503***
(0.082)
0.158**
(0.077)

-1.011***
(0.222)
0.228
(0.196)
0.191***
(0.036)
0.751***
(0.034)

1.704**
(0.839)
3.530***
(0.646)
0.577***
(0.089)
0.181**
(0.087)

-0.512**
(0.204)
0.484***
(0.153)
0.194***
(0.036)
0.783***
(0.032)

-0.865**
(0.399)
0.581
(0.739)
1.585
(1.156)
0.579*
(0.324)
-2.034
(1.360)
-0.337
(0.344)

0.014
(0.151)
-0.481
(0.367)
-0.080
(0.397)
0.663**
(0.287)
0.296
(0.459)
0.048
(0.252)

- 1.007**
(0.465)
-0.007
(0.809)
1.357
(0.887)
0.597***
(0.227)
-2.229*
(1.199)
-0.310
(0.244)

-0.087
(0.137)
-0.627*
(0.345)
0.034
(0.312)
0.516**
(0.218)
0.562
(0.422)
-0.061
(0.104)

-0.019
(0.412)

-0.245
(0.217)

-0.930*
(0.518)

-0.089
(0.254)

0.566
(0.486)

-0.444*
(0.262)

1.011*
(0.579)

Site characteristics
Chemical industry site
Manufacturing site
Landfill
Industrial waste site
Site location-Suburban
Site location-Rural
Total number of operable units
Area of the site in square kilometers
Hazard ranking score
Site media citations, 1988-1992
National Priorities List listing for site between
1981-1984
National Priorities List listing for site between
1985-1988
Federal enforcement cleanup
State enforcement cleanup

1.242*
(0.658)
0.576
(0.468)
-1.327**
(0.571)
0.933
(1.000)
-0.237
(0.504)
-0.908
(0.852)
-0.698***
(0.249)
-0.082
(0.123)
-0.036
(0.030)
0.163
(0.134)

-0.649
(0.556)
0.109
(0.322)
-0.336
(0.356)
-0.170
(0.635)
0.576
(0.434)
1.499**
(0.657)
-0.168
(0.181)
0.026
(0.056)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.044
(0.061)

0.324
(0.607)

0.277
(0.312)

0.304
(0.569)
1.415
(2.803)
1.289
(2.883)

0.110
(0.330)
0.723
(1.378)
0.505
(1.535)

-0.607***
(0.228)
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1-Continued.

(i) High risk
Site lead being negotiated
Fund-ledcleanup
Number of waste-generatingfacilities within a
1-mile radius
Population(in thousands)per squaremile,
1-mile ring
Minoritypopulationpercentagefor the 1-mile
ring
Mean household income of residents within
1-mile ring
($ thousands)
County voting percentage, 1988
Environmentalgroup members per 1,000 state
residents
House League of ConservationVoters' score,
1988-1992
Senate League of ConservationVoters' score,
1988-1992
R2
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(ii) Low risk

0.597
(2.610)
1.651
(2.544)

0.605
(1.410)
-0.496
(1.586)

0.024
(0.030)

-0.023
(0.020)

-0.211*
(0.117)

0.179*
(0.097)

-0.046***
(0.012)

-0.016*
(0.008)

0.046***
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.032)

0.033***
(0.012)
-0.056**
(0.024)

-.0.475***
(0.172)

0.121
(0.149)

0.016*
(0.009)

-0.003
(0.007)

-0.065***
(0.016)
0.582

-0.020
(0.013)
0.662

(iii)b

High risk

0.700

(iv)b

Low risk

0.756

Notes: Significancelevels using two-tailedtests: * significantat 10 percent;** = significantat 5 percent;* = significant
at 1 percent.
a All standarderrorsare robust standarderrorsbased on the clusteredmodel. Clusterswere based upon unique pathways
defined by site, exposure medium (soil?), time frame (current?),exposurelocation (resident?),and age (child?).N = 479 in
132 clusters for high-risk group. N = 2,409 in 220 clusters for low-risk group. The robust clustered model also included
indicatorsof site location by EPA region. Omitted dummy variables are: semivolatiles, other site types, urban, 1989-1992
National PrioritiesList listing date, unspecified site lead, and federal standards.
b The model also includedfixed-effect variablesby site for 85 of the 86 sites representedby the 2,888 chemical pathways.
Omitteddummy variables were for semivolatiles and federal standards.Sample sizes as above.

variablescalculatedat the site level, which also
influence target selection. Landfills receive
more stringentrisk targetsin the high-risksample, perhapsbecause the representativenessheuristic means that Superfundlandfills are seen as
similar to notorious leaking landfills. Note that
the variables related to risk-perceptionbias of
availability/representativeness, such as the
chemical media citations variableand the landfill dummy, are statisticallysignificantonly for
the high-risk sample. This result is consistent
with biases coming into play when risks are
large enough to command regulators' or local
residents' attention.Sites which are mentioned

more in the media did not receive lower chemical targetrisks.'3
13
Though site-level media coverage could be viewed
as endogenous, we lack good instruments to estimate
coverage. Dropping this variable leaves the other results
unchanged in terms of their statistical significance, sign,
and general magnitude. The endogeneity of variables
such as media coverage and hazard ranking score (HRS)
means that the coefficients estimated for variables likely
to influence coverage or the HRS will only capture the
partial effects of these variables. Consider the case of
measuring the influence of chemical toxicity, which can
affect a site's HRS. The toxicity elasticity presented will
only be a partial elasticity based on holding constant the

1020

THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW

The sitecharacteristic
varableresultsindicatethat
concems may affect stanbroadpopulation-based
dardsettings,even thoughEPA guidelinesfocuson
individualratherthanpopulationrisks.Forhigh individualrisk levels the agencysets more stringent
thegreaterthepopulationdensity.
cleanupstandards
The agencyadoptstheoppositecourseforlow-level
risks,whereas populationdensityrises the agency
sets less stringentstandards.This may be in part
becauseas densityincreasesscrutinyof regulator
actionsdealingwith low-level risks may be less
likely if people are less likely to monitoragency
as the numberof peoplein an area
decision-making
grows. Ruralsites also receivedless stringentrequirementsin the low-risksample.If regulatorsbelievedthatthesesiteswere less likelyto experience
residentialdevelopmentin the future,thenthisvariable couldbe capturingsome of the effectsassociated with distinctionsbetween currentand future
residentialpathways.
AlthoughEPA appearsto respondto economic
concers relatng to the populationat risk, it also
reactsto politicalconcems. The higherthe voter
turnoutin the area,the lowerthe targetriskchosen
when risksarelow. Note thatwhen risksarehigh,
politicalactivityhas no effect on standards.It is
when nsks are low thatpoliticalactivitymatters.
This findingis consistentwith previousresultsthat
indicatethatdifferencesin thepotentialforresidents
to engage in collectiveactionaffecthow polluters
of environmental
risks(Hamiltreatthe distnbution
ton, 1993, 1995).Similarly,thehigherthemembershipin environmental
groupsper 1,000residentsin
the state,the lowerthe targetriskset for high-level
risks. The higher the support[as measuredby
Voters'scoresfor 1988Leagueof Conservation
1992]by a state'ssenatorsfor environmental
legislation,thelowertherisktargetssetby theEPA.This
resultmay reflectresponsivenessto congressional
principalsby regulatoryagents,or if environmental
constituentsare representedby environmentaists
thiseffectmay simplyreflectadditionalresponsiveness of regulatorsto local preferencesfor environmentalprotection.14

HRS. The total elasticity would reflect a direct effect and
an indirect effect through the influence of the HRS. We
thank a referee for this point.
14

To the extent that environmentalgroup membership
and legislator votes reflect the values thatresidentsplace on
the environment,then these variables could also represent
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The community variable results go against
some popularbeliefs. At sites with higher average income levels in the 1-mile ring around a
site, a higher risk target will be set. This result
may be because regulators believe wealthier
residents are less likely to be exposed as assumed in the risk assessments (e.g., groundwater exposures assume well-water consumption,
while wealthier residents may be connected to
public systems). However, the finding is also
consistent with environmentalequity concerms
focusing more policy attention on risks to the
economically disadvantaged.This latterhypothesis is consistent with the influence of a higher
minority percentage in an area, which leads to
the selection of a more stringentrisk target.
Several possible factors may be at work.
Since these remediation decisions were made
after the policy debate over environmentalequity began, regulatorsmay have been more conscious of the treatmentof risks to the poor and
minorities.In addition,the risk-perceptionliterature (see James FL.Flynn et al., 1994) demonstrates that minorities are more likely to
perceive given levels of environmentalrisks as
high risks to humanhealth, which could generate more demand for risk regulation in these
communities.Regulatorsmight also believe that
calculated risks in minority communities were
more likely to arise (e.g., if minorities were
more likely to consume contaminatedgroundwater). Since there are no adjustmentsfor this
influence in EPA's site-level risk analyses, regulatorsmay treatreportedrisks more stringently
in these communities.
For the high-riskpathways,the elasticities of
the target risk variable with respect to several
of the key statisticallysignificantvariableswere
as follows: environmental group membership
(-4.82), senators'environmentalvoting records
(-4.12), the pathway's initial risk level (0.16),
chemicaltoxicity(0.50), residents'income (1.84),
and the minoritypercentagein the 1-mile ring
(-1.06). For the low-risk pathways,the mix of
statisticallysignificantvariables was somewhat

values an efficiency-minded regulator would consider in
making cleanup decisions. The significance of the voter
turnoutvariablerepresentsa political bias, however, since it
reflects the likelihood a regulatorwill face local scrutinyor
pressure.
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different, including the following elasticities:
voterturnout(-2.97), the initialrisk level (0.75),
chemical toxicity (0.19), and residents' income
(1.43). Overall,politicalfactorsappearto be the
most influentialin termsof the degreeof responsiveness of the cleanupstringencyto changes in
the variablelevel.
B. Cost per Case of Cancer Estimates
Anotherway to examine the reactionsof regulators to risks at Superfundsites is to explore
the determinantsof the site-level expenditureof
cleanup funds and the implied costs per cancer
case averted by remediations.To calculate the
costs per case of cancer, we calculate the sitespecific risk datawith block group-levelCensus
population data using the geographic information systems methodology. 5 The site remediation costs for the sample of sites with matching
risk data had a mean of $15.0 million (1993$).
The range of site costs from $57,000 to $133.9
million reflectsdifferencesin both stringencyof
remedy selection and degree of contamination.
Superfundsite documents focus only on individual risk levels. The mean numberof cancer
cases avertedover a 30-year period is 5.6, with
a range from 0 to 652 and a median of .019
cancercases avertedper site. The mean cost per
cancer case avertedimplied by the EPA expenditures at the sample of 130 sites is $11.7 billion, with a range from less than $20,000 to
$961 billion. The mediancost per case of cancer
was $418 million, and only 36 of 130 were
below $100 million per cancer case averted.16
These estimates take EPA's conservative risk
assessmentsat face value and assume no latency
periodfor cancer.Makingsuch adjustments(for
a sample of 99 sites) leads to a median cost per
case of cancerabove $1 billion.17 If remediation
expenditures are analyzed based on averting

'- See Hamiltonand Viscusi (1999) for furtherdetails on
how we estimated the cancer cases presented.
16 These results reflect EPA's risk-assessmentpractices
and have not been adjusted to reflect the "conservatism"
practices that lead to an upwardbias in the risk estimates.
This is similarto the mediancost per cancer case avertedof
$388 million we found in a larger sample of 145 sites.
17 See Viscusi and Hamilton (1996) and Hamilton and
Viscusi (1999).
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cancer cases alone, the Superfundprogramhas
relatively high regulatorycosts.
Table 2 presentsestimatesof the equationfor
the log of the cost per cancer case averted.
Many of the influences reflected in Table
2's analysis of the cost per case of cancer
avoided are similar to those in the target risk
selection estimates. Sites with a high maximum
pathway risk are associated with a lower cost
per case of cancer, which parallels the result
from Table 1 that cleanup levels are less stringent if the risk at the site is high. As the presence of current exposed populations did not
affect the targetrisk level, even thoughit should
have led to more stringent regulations on an
efficiency basis, in the cost per case of cancer
regression estimates there is not a statistically
significantinfluence of time frame on expenditures. Rather than setting more stringent standardswith a higher cost per case of cancer for
current exposed populations, EPA incurs as
high a cost per case of cancer when there are
only potential future populations at risk. Thus,
the targetrisk level and cost per case for cancer
results are reflective of a common pattern of
influence. The higher population density leads
to a lower cost per case of cancer averted because the presenceof a substantialexposed population makes cleanup more efficacious from a
benefit-coststandpoint.What should be emphasized, however, is that EPA is not pursuing a
policy of equalizing the marginalcost per case
of cancer avoided across sites, which would be
the efficiency dictum if cancer were the only
outcome of policy interest.Rather,by basing its
policies on an individualrisk approachthatdoes
not reflect the size of the exposed populationor
whether the population now exists at the site,
EPA is often failing to recognize importantaspects of the overall benefit consequences of its
efforts.
Politics does influence the cost per cancer
case avoided.The most influentialpolitical variable in Table 2 is the county voting percentage
in 1988. Counties with high voter turnouthave
sites in which the cost per case of cancer
avoided is greater,indicating a greaterwillingness of EPA to expend funds on cleanupat sites
with substantialpolitical influence. The elasticity of the cost per case of cancer with respect to
voter turnoutis quite high-4.14. Political pressures exert a powerful influence on the degree
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TABLE 2-DETERMINANTS

SEPTEMBER1999

OF LOG (COST PER CANCER CASE AvOIDED)a

Site characteristics

Parameter
estimate

Standard
error

Log of the maximum pathway risk at the site
Existence of cancer risk pathways at site under currentscenario
Site location-Suburban
Site location-Rural
Both soil and groundwatercosts expended at the site
Total numberof operableunits
Area of the site in squarekilometers
Hazardranking score
National PrioritiesList listing for site between 1981-1984
National PrioritiesList listing for site between 1985-1988
Number of waste-generatingfacilities within a 1-mile radius
Population(in thousands)per squaremile, 1-mile ring
Minority populationpercentagefor the 1-mile ring
Mean income of residents within 1-mile ring ($ thousands)
County voting percentage, 1988
Environmentalgroup membersper 1,000 state residents
House League of ConservationVoters' score, 1988-1992
Senate League of ConservationVoters' score, 1988-1992

-0.379***
-0.845
- 1.308**
-1.710**
-0.863
-0.247
-0.025*
0.012
1.655***
1.129*
0.016
-0.606***
-0.009
-0.008
0.080**
-0.208
0.0008
0.008

0.083
0.539
0.651
0.734
1.162
0.274
0.015
0.030
0.576
0.574
0.035
0.151
0.014
0.024
0.040
0.150
0.009
0.022

Notes: Significance levels using two-tailed tests: * = significant at 10 percent; ** =
significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent.R2 = 0.453.
a The model also included indicators of site location by EPA region. Omitted dummy
variables are: urban site location, 1989-1992 National Priorities List listing date, and
standarderrors
presence of soil or groundwatercosts only. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted
are reported.N = 130.

of inefficiency in the cleanup expenditures.
These results reflect the same patternof influence as in the targetrisk regressions,thoughthe
magnitudeof the elasticity is larger.
The presence of minority populations and
people of differentincome groupsdid not, however, affect the cost per case of cancer averted
under EPA policy decisions. The greatervaluations of risk by the more affluent also do not
affect policy decisions. The cost per case of
cancer avoided is lower at large sites, which
may be reflective of their greaterrisks and potential economies of scale in cleanup.
III. The Distributionof Cost-Effectiveness
From the standpointof economic efficiency,
it is desirable to focus cleanup efforts on the
most cost-effective sites. Many risk analysts
have noted that there is substantialheterogeneity in the efficacy of risk-reductionpolicies and
that efforts with a cost-per-life-saved value
above some cutoff level, such as $5 million per
life, should not be pursuedif mortalityrisks are
the sole matterof concern. Such targetingmay

save considerableresourcesat very little opportunity cost in terms of health benefits forgone.
How large these opportunity costs will be
depends on the distributionof the efficacy of
cleanup actions. SupremeCourtJustice Stephen
Breyer (1993) has hypothesized that there is
often a 90-10 principlewherebysociety derives
90 percentof the benefitfrom the most effective
10 percent of the risk-reductionexpenditures.
To explore the relationship for our Superfund
sample we rankedthe sites from the most costeffective to the least cost-effective. Thus, the
comparison is across sites, given the cleanup
policies selected, rather than within a site for
differing gradationsof cleanup.
Table 3 reportsthe distributionof these costeffectiveness values for different 5-percentile
groupings of site expenditures.Virtually all of
the expected cancer cases to be reduced-over
99 percent-are preventedby the first 5 percent
of expenditures.Although many of these initial
allocations are clearly worthwhile, by the 5th
percentile the marginal cost reaches $145 mil
lion. At the mediansite expenditure,the cost per
case of cancer prevented is in excess of $6

VOL.89 NO. 4

VISCUSIAND HAMILTON:ARE RISKREGILATORSRATIONAL?

1023

TABLE3-SUMMARYOFSUPERFUNI)
COST-EFFECTIVENESSa
Percentageof remediation
expenditures,rankedby
cancer cost-effectiveness

Cumulativepercentageof
total expected cancer
cases averted(sites = 99)

Marginalcost per cancer
case averted ($ millions)

5
25
50
75
95

99.47
99.86
99.96
99.97
99.98

$
145
$ 1,107
$ 6,442
$ 28,257
$241,058

a Using the following assumptions:averageexposureconcentrationsand intakeparameters,
3-percentdiscount rate for cost, 3-percentdiscount rate for cancers, and assuming a 10-year
latency period for the developmentof cancer.

billion, and at the least cost-effective 5 percent
of the expenditures,the cost per case of calncer
rises to above $200 billion.
The interesting economic issue is what factors drive these decisions of quite different efficacy. Is EPA simply implementing an
identical, rigid set of policy concerns for all
sites or is there a different character of the
influences that are operationalfor sites of differing efficacy? To explore these issues, we will
analyze the determinantsof the value of the log
of the cost per case of canceravertedat different
fractiles of the distributionusing a quantileregression model. More specifically, the estimated coefficients of the cost per cancer Q at
the Tth quantile satisfy
(4) QuantT(QilXi)= XJ,I

i

=

1, ...,

where Xi is a k X 1 vector of covariatesand the
vector of coefficients for the rth quantile is
designatedby BT.18
Table 4 reportsthe estimatesof an OLS equation and quantileregression models for the analog of the resultsin Table 2. Some insignificant
variableswere not included in this model so as
to attainconvergence. The asymptoticstandard
errorsreportedare bootstrapstandarderrors.
The results in Table 4 reinforce and extend
the implications of the earlier results. The
maximum pathway risk reduces the cost per
cancer case in a similar manner for all quan18 See Roger Koenkerand GilbertBassett, Jr. (1978) for
furtherdiscussion as well as Moshe Buchinsky (1994). We
use a bootstrapestimatorto obtain the value of the asymptotic standarderrors.

tiles, as the presence of the substantialrisks is
always influential. Current cancer pathway
risks do not affect the cost per cancer case
except at the 90th percentile, where they reduce the costs per case. Site media citations
are not consistently influential. The National
Priorities List listing from 1981-1984 generally makes the cost per case higher, perhaps
because the sites from that era that remain as
cleanup targets in 1991-1992 are the least
cost-effective. Population density enhances
cost-effectiveness, where this influence is
greatest for the most cost-effective sites.
The most intriguing results pertain to the
effect of the dominantpolitical variable in the
analysis-the county voting percentage. The
earlier analyses suggested that political factors
may promote inefficiency. These results document the locus of this effect. The voting variable strongly affects the cost per cancer case
and target risk selection in OLS analyses, but
the quantileregressionresults indicate that this
effect is highly selective. For sites with costeffectiveness at the median or better,the voting
percentagedoes not affect the cost-per-cancercase level selected. Influences such as the risk
level and population density are more influential for these more cost-effective sites. However,
at the two upper percentiles of the costeffectiveness distribution, higher voting rates
boost the cost per case of cancer averted.These
political factors are consequently only influential at the most inefficient sites where the dollar
costs per case of cancer are in the billions.
Moreover, at these sites, the political factors
increase the extent of the inefficiency. Politics
only matters through its adverse effect on the
most inefficient cleanups.
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RESULTSFORLOG (COST PERCANCERCASE AvOIDED)a
TABLE4-QUANTILE REGRESSION
Percentile for quantile regression
Coefficient (standard error)
OLS

Variable
Log of the maximum pathway risk
at the site
Existence of cancer risk pathway at
site under current scenario
Site media citations, 1988-1992
National Priorities List listing for
site between 1981-1984
National Priorities List listing for
site between 1985-1988
Population (in thousands) per square
mile, 1-mile ring
County voting percentage, 1988

Pseudo R2(R2 for OLS)

-0.381***
(0.075)
-0.891*
(0.531)
-0.139
(0.117)
1.553***
(0.527)
0.854*
(0.507)
0.600***
(0.152)
0.079**
(0.037)
0.442

0.10
-0.374***
(0.140)
-0.192
(0.844)
-0.245
(0.255)
1.889**
(0.862)
0.765
(0.717)
- 1.055**
(0.472)
-0.013
(0.086)
0.359

0.25
-0.383***
(0.102)
-1.294
(0.960)
0.054
(0.196)
1.398*
(0.740)
0.350
(1.004)
-0.825**
(0.365)
0.014
(0.057)
0.268

0.50
-0.390***
(0.074)
-0.889
(0.872)
-0.064
(0.125)
1.155
(0.851)
1.033
(0.741)
-0.247
(0.281)
0.083
(0.056)
0.265

0.75
-0.356***
(0.101)
-1.107
(0.763)
-0.242*
(0.135)
2.338***
(0.612)
0.984*
(0.569)
-0.406*
(0.206)
0.114**
(0.050)
0.357

0.90
-0.445***
(0.128)
-1.747*
(1.011)
-0.160
(0.232)
2.273***
(0.706)
1.877**
(0.872)
-0.285
(0.338)
0.139**
(0.056)
0.418

significant
Notes: Significancelevels using two-tailedtests: * significantat 10 percent;** significantat 5 percent;*
at 1 percent.
aAll models also included a series of variables for site location (suburban, rural), minority population, income,
environmentalgroupmembers,Senate League of ConservationVoters' score, both soil and groundwatercosts expended,and
six EPA region variables. To reduce convergence problems some insignificant variables from the earlier analysis were
omitted.

IV. Conclusions
Cleanupsof hazardouswaste sites in the Superfund program inevitably involve decisions
about risk, since they affect the potential exposure of residentsto contaminants,and decisions
that are political, since they allocate limited
funds across sites. Prior research on risk regulation indicates that regulator decisions may
reflect biases in risk perception(Viscusi, 1995)
and that who bears the risks may affect how
they are treated(Cropperet al, 1992). Previous
work on the Superfund program has found
mixed evidence on the degree that characteristics of the surrounding community or their
political representativesinfluence cleanup selections (Hird, 1993, 1994; Zimmerman,1993;
Gupta et al., 1995, 1996).
This article made four distinct contributions
to the literatureon risk regulation and Superfund decision-making. We combined detailed
risk information with Census data to yield a
direct measure of cleanup efficiency, the cost
per cancercase averted.We used multiplemea-

sures describingthe characterof risks to establish thatbiases in risk perceptionare reflectedin
cleanup decisions. We demonstratedthat the
likelihood that residents will engage in collective action does cause regulatorsto adopt more
stringentcleanup standardsand spend more to
avertcancercases. We also revealed that differences in political power matterto push regulators toward greaterinefficiency in remediation
decisions.
If decision makersat Superfundsites targeted
for cleanups were concerned solely with social
welfare maximization, then these regulators
would choose targetrisks for cleanupsbased on
factors related to marginalsocial benefits (e.g.,
expected cancer cases) and marginal social
costs (e.g., factors which influence remediation
costs, such as site characteristicsand baseline
risks). Unfortunately,many of the critical economic concerns do not affect decisions in the
desired manner.
Ouranalysisreveals thatregulators'choice of
risk targets is influenced by many additional
factors relatingboth to risk perceptionsand the
political nature of the community bearing the

VOL.89 NO. 4

VISCUSIAND HAMILTON:ARE RISKREGULATORSRATIONAL?

risks. For high-risk pathways, chemicals with
more citationsin the popularpress, landfillsites,
and pathways with lower baseline risks all received more stringentrisk targets.These results
are consistentwith variousphenomenafound in
the risk-perceptionliterature,such as the availability heuristic. Perhaps equally disturbingis
the failure of key benefit variabies to affect
decisions in the expected manner.The presence
of a risk to people based on current land-use
patternsratherthan hypotheticalfutureuses did
not increase the stringency of the regulation.
Pathways exposing currentresidents generally
did not receive more stringentstandards.EPA is
thus failing to target its efforts to reflect the
overall health implicationsof risks to currently
exposed populations.
What does appearto be influentialare a variety of political influences pertaining to the
natureof the community.Sites in counties with
higher voter turnouts,states with more environmentalists, and states with senators with stronger environmentalvoting recordswere all more
likely to have stricter environmentalcleanup
targets. Scrutiny from the bottom up and top
down may influence regulatorselections. Environmentalmembershipand legislatorvotes may
proxy for the values individuals place on the
environment,so those variables could relate to
local valuations that an efficiency-mindedregulator would consider. The degree of constituent political activities, measured by voter
turnout,should not influence regulatorsunless
they are affected by political concerns.A major
drawback of political pressure is that it does
not serve here as a mechanism for promoting
efficiency-basedconcerns. Indeed, higher voter
turnouthas a greatereffect in increasing stringency when the risks are small. These political
pressurespush EPA furtheraway from an efficient policy design.
The cost per case of cancer preventedanalysis yielded results that were in many respects
similar. However, in this case simply the mean
value of the cost per case of cancer, which was
measuredin billions of dollars, was quite telling. EPA cleanuppolicies are an outlier among
government regulatory programs on any efficiency basis, assuming cancer preventionis the
primary objective. The benefits of Superfund
cleanup are highly concentratedat a very small
percentage of sites, with most cleanup actions
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failing any reasonableefficiency test. The quantile regression results highlighted the pivotal
role of political factors for inefficient cleanups,
whereas the most desirable cleanups were not
influenced by voting rates.
In sum, these results indicate that in hazardous waste cleanup decisions risk-perception
biases and risk politics matter.One cannot distinguish with the current information whether
risk perceptions matterprimarilybecause they
reflect biases of regulators as individuals or
regulators as representatives of constituents
with biased perceptions,a topic with significant
implications about the efficiency of regulator
decisions. We can, however, indicatethe impact
on social welfare of the likelihood thatresidents
will engage in collective actions. Recent debates have reprised the question on the degree
that democracy promotes efficiency (see Gary
S. Becker, 1983; Donald Wittman, 1989, 1995;
John R. Lott, Jr., 1997). We find that in the
Superfund program collective action is most
effective when risks are small and when expendituresto avert cancer cases are many ordersof
magnitudegreaterthanfiguresthatemerge from
private-marketdecisions. In the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, our work indicates that
greater scrutiny from residents pushes regulators away from decisions likely to maximize
social welfare.
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